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Big Steel's Imbroglio
Illusory Profits and Real Taxes
By Sue Siferd and John Talbott
Financial publications would cer­
tainly lead one to place little credence 
in the contention that there is currently 
an erosion of business capital in this 
country, caused by confiscatory taxes, 
which is precluding industrial growth.
“These Republic Steel fourth 
quarter 1978 earnings were 60 cents 
above my estimate” confessed one 
analyst at a major brokerage concern.1
“Our most likely earnings estimates 
for 1979 assume 20 percent earnings 
gains for most of the major steel com­
panies while our high end 1980 
forecast shows earnings rising by 
another 50 percent,” noted another.2
Despite the euphoria associated with 
such comments, it may be argued that 
in periods of inflation our existing tax 
laws provide for confiscatory tax rates 
well above the statutory limit. These 
confiscatory taxes stem from busi­
nesses’ unwillingness and/or inability 
to deal with the inflation effect on 
earnings. What legislator in his right 
mind, for example, is going to vote for 
significant tax relief for corporations 
who continue to report record annual 
earnings?
Such earnings reports, in fact, are 
the basis of “obscene profit” remarks 
which appear to have led to an anti­
business environment in the country at 
large. By masking the erosion of 
capital with spurious profits, signifi­
cant tax reform is stymied. In essence, 
the time has come to realize that cor­
porate external reporting, based on 
historic costs, is a major contributor to 
the stagflation affecting our country. 
The purpose of this article is to ex­
amine that contention.
The Study:
To support the position, 1977 an­
nual reports and 10-K’s of 13 major 
iron and steel producers were studied. 
Table One shows the 13 companies in 
our study and their total assets at 
December 31, 1977, as well as their re­
ported net income after tax and their 
return on assets for 1977.
Table Two shows net income, 
replacement cost net income, common 
stock dividends, and excess of com­
mon stock dividends over replacement 
cost net income. Admittedly, the 
replacement cost figures generated via 
Accounting Series Release 190 are no 
panacea. Realistically, replacements 
will take place over many years and 
the new plant will provide additional 
revenue generating services and 
operating efficiencies. As a result, the 
replacement cost net income may paint 
a more dire picture than reality would 
warrant.
Bearing this caveat in mind, 
however, Table Two results are in­
dicative of the erosion of business 
capital. Only four of the companies 
generated a positive replacement cost 
net income. Moreover, the common 
stock dividends for twelve of the com­
panies exceeded the replacement cost 
net income. In fact, Carpenter Tech­
nology was the only company in the 
study whose common stock dividends 
did not exceed replacement cost net 
income.
Table Three compares the addi­
tional replacement cost expense as a 
percentage of income before tax, in­
come after tax, and common stock 
dividends. For the twelve companies 
reporting an after tax profit, the addi­
tional replacement cost expense was at 
least one hundred percent for seven of 
the companies. Perhaps more informa­
tive, however, the replacement cost ex­
pense was no less than sixty percent of 
reported after tax income for any of 
the companies studied.
The staggering implications of these 
figures may be more readily under­
stood if we arbitrarily assume that the 
“true” costs are only one-half as great 
as the reported replacement costs 
would indicate. Even under these 
assumptions, a significant portion of 
net income is illusory in nature and is 
neither available for dividends nor for 
capital expansion projects but is being 
clandestinely employed to replace 
higher priced plant, equipment and in­
ventories.
In Table Four we have listed the pri­
mary earnings per share, replacement 
cost earnings per share, and dividends 
per share. In light of the fact that all 
corporations with the exception of 
Carpenter Technology were engaging 
in liquidating dividends, investors 
should cast a wary eye at the early 
1979 market recovery of a number of 
the steel stocks.
The Trigger
This recovery, in fact, stems pri­
marily from the subsidization of the 
steel industry through the “trigger” 
price mechanism which sets an ar­
bitrarily high price for foreign steel. 
The combination of the trigger with 
high demand has raised steel prices 
sharply in an era when the administra­
tion anathema is inflation, and will ex­
acerbate pricing problems for other 
U.S. industries that must employ steel 
in their manufacturing processes. 
More specifically, these industries will 
now find themselves at a similar com­
petitive disadvantage with their 
foreign counterparts, as steel did 
earlier. While the exact impact on the 
economy as a whole is debatable, it is 
safe to assume that aggregate results 
are far from salutary as a result of sub­
sidizing a particular industry.
The trigger price fiasco also demon­
strates once again that historical costs 
which provide for illusory profits and 
confiscatory taxes in periods of ram­
pant inflation are a nemesis to the 
economy in general. This is due, of 
course, to the way that the tax system 
handles depreciation. If a company 
spends $1-million on labor, it deducts 
the dollars against sales revenue of ap­
proximately equal purchasing power.
16/The Woman CPA
TABLE ONE
(Figures in 1.000's of Dollars)
(1) Bethlehem reported a loss of $ 120-million before taxes (a credit) and nonrecurring items; the nonrecurring item in­
cluded a $750-million estimated cost of closedown of facilities.
(2) Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1978.
Source: 10-K’s and Annual Reports, 1977.
Name of Company
Total Assets 





Armco Steel Corporation $ 2,882,754 $119,832 4.16%
Bethlehem Steel Corporation 4,898,900 (448,200)(1) -9.15%
Carpenter Technology Corporation(2 3) 263,999 33,753 12.79%
The Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company 354,615 26,111 7.36%
Copperweld Corporation 268,083 16,307 6.08%
Cyclops Corporation 333,332 8,992 2.70%
Inland Steel Company 2,302,352 87,801 3.81%
Kaiser Steel Corporation 961,440 4,544 0.47%
Lukens Steel Company 188,241 12,070 6.41%
National Steel Corporation 2,827,646 60,125 2.13%
Republic Steel Corporation 2,406,330 41,031 1.71%
United States Steel Corporation 9,914,400 137,900 1.39%
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation 765,691 ( 25,630) -3.35%
Totals $28,367,783 $125,896 0.44%
(1) Replacement Cost Net Income = Net Income minus Additional Replacement Cost Expense. Additional Replacement 
Cost Expense is determined from the 10-K reports and is the sum of the excess of Replacement Cost of Goods Sold 
and Replacement Cost Depreciation Expense, over Historical Cost of Goods Sold and Depreciation Expense. The tax 
effect of the Additional Replacement Cost Expense is not reported since such costs are not a deduction under present 
income tax laws. Appendix A reports this information.
(2) Also paid a preferred stock dividend.
(3) Paid one-half preferred dividend.
(4) Carpenter Technology Corporation is the only company in our study whose Common Stock Dividends did not exceed 
Replacement Cost Net Income.
Source: 1977 Annual Reports, 10-K’s and our computations.
(5) The tax effect of additional Replacement Cost has not been considered in these computations because present Fed­
eral Income Tax Laws do not allow this expense as a deduction for tax purposes. See Appendix A for the hypothet­
ical tax effect.
TABLE TWO







Excess of Common Stock 
Dividends over Replacement 
Cost Net Income
Armco $119,832 ($25,168) $53,310(2) $ 78,478
Bethlehem (448,200) (836,200) 65,500 901,700
Carpenter 33,753 12,353 10,216 (2,137)(4 5)
Cleveland-Cliffs 26,111 10,467 12,250 1,783
Copperweld 16,307 3,693 6,732 3,039
Cyclops 8,992 (31,977) 2,774(2) 35,781
Inland 87,801 (199) 52,654(2) 51,314
Kaiser 4,544 (76,009) 10,449(2) 86,499
Lukens 12,070 1,633 4,128 2,495
National 60,125 (42,875) 48,232 91,107
Republic 41,031 (137,492) 25,892 163,384
U.S. Steel 137,900 (362,100) 182,400 544,500
Wheeling-Pittsburgh (25,630) (75,204) 0(2) (3) 75,204
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Corporate external reporting 
based on historic costs is a 
major contributor to stagfla­
tion in the economy.
If the company spends the same $1- 
million on a building, however, it will 
soon be matching the depreciation 
charge against inflated sales dollars of 
reduced purchasing power. The result­
ant products, of course, are spurious 
profits and excessive tax bills. While 
this process hurts all business, it is par­
ticularly detrimental to industries such 
as steel with lengthy capital turnover.
In an interview, Forbes magazine 
asked U.S. Steel’s vice president-con­
troller, Bracy Smith, whether the steel 
industry has been hurt by the fact that 
its profits were overstated. “I suspect 
that it has,” Smith said, “because peo­
ple say, 'Hell, you’re making this much 
money; why do you need more?’ ”3
Politicians, of course, are extremely 
susceptible to this type of logic and 
their historical attitude toward steel 
over the past twenty-five years is am­
ple indication of the ominous implica­
tions of fictitious figures.
In 1952, for example, Truman 
seized the steel industries to prevent 
what he deemed to be inordinate prof­
its and a wage-price spiral. In 1962, 
Kennedy castigated U.S. Steel publicly 
over a proposed price increase of less 
than four percent and in 1972 Nixon 
heaped a great deal of “jawboning” on 
the industry. Of more recent interest 
was the initial Carter posture of dis­
paraging steel over a proposed price 
increase which belatedly gave way to 
the trigger mechanism as layoffs in the 
industry increased and political pres­
sure mounted.
Whenever demand for American 
steel placed the steel industry in a posi­
tion to get higher prices and profits, 
the government forced it to settle for 
less.4 Those decisions initially took 
their toll in such events as Bethlehem 
Steel’s multi-million dollar write-off of 
its outdated Lackawanna, New York 
plant and will soon be causing eco­
nomic dislocations as a result of 
market interference associated with 
the “trigger” prices.
Both types of events could possibly 
have been avoided with more 
liberalized depreciation rules or other 
tax policies which would have 
benefited the economy in general. The 
need for such policies is evident if one 
examines the replacement cost figures 
generated via ASR 190.
In essence, the dissemination of such 
figures via financial publications as 
opposed to their obfuscating position 
within 10-K’s might have proved an 
impetus for tax reform which would 
have provided for a healthy domestic 
steel industry and obviated the need 
for the trigger mechanism which now 
threatens widespread economic dis­
locations.
Why Not Management:
Intuitively, one would expect man­
agement to adopt those accounting 
techniques which would reflect eco­
nomic reality and strengthen the cor-
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porate position vis-a-vis ubiquitous 
governmental taxing units. On closer 
inspection, however, it appears that 
management often favors high fic­
titious earnings as opposed to lower 
real earnings and attempts to employ 
those apocryphal figures to cement its 
position within the company and to in­
crease personal remuneration.
There have been several studies 
which corroborate these contentions. 
Duvall and Austin, for example, found 
that managers of firms with depressed 
earnings and stock prices are more 
likely to find themselves thrown out of 
office by dissident stockholders.5
Lee Seidler, of New York Univer­
sity, expressed it succinctly: “I would 
suppose the fact that management 
holds stock options and things of that 
sort may sway their judgment.”6
Conclusion:
Reporting of inflated profits by in­
dustries such as steel has resulted in 
real tax rates of an inordinate mag­
nitude which have diminished steel's 
competitive position vis-a-vis coun­
tries such as Japan whose tax system 
imposes no special burden on capital 
intensive industries. Moreover, pres­
sures on corporate management in the 
earnings per share arena appear to 
have perverted the very group who 
should have lobbied for more liberal 
tax rules to combat the competitive 
decline.
The scenario that has developed in 
steel is actually somewhat frightening. 
A decline in a basic industry results in 
political pressure to subsidize the in­
dustry. These subsidization efforts in 
turn lead to a decline in competitive 
position for steel processors who in 
turn demand political help which 
further fuels inflationary force. As ta­
bles two, three and four indicate, the 
steel industry does need help. The crux 
of the matter is that profit figures re­
ported by management appear to be 
one of the prime reasons that the help 
is in the form of triggers and not taxes. 
The resultant product may well be 
economic stagnation through protec­
tionism.
NOTES
1'Heard on the Street,” The Wall Street Jour­
nal, January 18, 1979, p. 37.
2Ibid.
3“Steel: Biting the Bullet,” Forbes, December 
1, 1977, p. 36.
4“Helping American Steel,” The Wall Street 
Journal, October 17. 1977, p. 26.
5R.M. Duvall and D.V. Austin. "Predicting 
the Results of Proxy Contests,” Journal of Fi­
nance, September 1965, pp. 464-471.
6“Steel: Biting the Bullet,” op. cit., p. 35.
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TABLE THREE
Additional Replacement Cost Expense as a Percentage of
Name of Company (a) Income Before Tax (b) Income After Tax (c) Common Stock Dividends
Armco 119.2% 121.0% 272.0%
Bethlehem ___ (1) ___ (2) 592.4%
Carpenter 32.2% 63.4% 209.5%
Cleveland-Cliffs 39.7% 59.9% 127.7%
Copperweld 54.6% 77.4% 187.4%
Cyclops 326.5% 455.6% 1476.9%
Inland 96.2% 100.2% 167.1%
Kaiser — (1) 1772.7% 770.9%
Lukens 47.2% 86.5% 252.8%
National 151.0% 171.3% 213.6%
Republic 429.9% 435.1% 689.5%
U.S. Steel 490.7% 362.6% 274.1%
Wheeling-Pittsburgh ___ (1) ----- (2) 0 (3)
(1) Reported loss before tax
(2) Reported net loss
(3) No common stock dividends issued










Average Number of 
Shares of Common Stock 
Outstanding
Armco $ 3.80 ($1,088) $1.80 29,700,000
Bethlehem ($10.27) ($19.15) $1.50 43,665,000
Carpenter $ 3.97 $1,452 $1.20 8,509,000
Cleveland-Cliffs $ 4.26 $1,709 $2.00 6,124,728
Copperweld $ 2.91 $0,658 $1.20 5,608,000
Cyclops $ 3.69 ($15.29) $1.30 2,158,394
Inland $ 4.23 ($.1086) $2.60 20,267,000
Kaiser $ 0.51 ($11.00) $1.50 6,996,891
Lukens $ 4.68 ($0,633) $1.60 2,579,000
National $ 3.12 ($2,225) $2.50 19,273,000
Republic $ 2.54 ($8,496) $1.60 16,183,000
U.S. Steel $ 1.66 ($4,362) $2.20 83,011,299
Wheeling-Pittsburgh ($ 7.70) ($20.17) 0 3,728,575
(1) Replacement Cost EPS = (Replacement Cost Net Income — Preferred Stock Dividend) divided by weighted average 
number of shares of common stock.
Source: Annual Reports, 10-K’s, and computations.
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APPENDIX A 
(All figures in 1000’s of dollars)








Excess of Common Stock 
Dividends over Replacement 
Cost Net Income Net of 
Tax Effect (2)
Armco $ 119,832 $ 44,432 $ 53,310 $ 8,878
Bethlehem (448,200) (649,960) 65,600 715,560
Carpenter 33,753 22,625 10,216 (12,409)
Cleveland-Cliffs 26,111 17,976 12,250 (5,726)
Copperweld 16,307 9,748 6,732 (3,016)
Cyclops 8,992 (12,312) 2,774 15,086
Inland 87,801 42,041 52,654 10,613
Kaiser 4,544 37,344 10,449 (26,895)
Lukens 12,070 6,643 4,128 (2,515)
National 60,125 6,565 48,232 41,667
Republic 41,031 (51,801) 25,892 77,693
U.S. Steel 137,900 (122,100) 182,400 304,500
Wheeling-Pittsburgh (25,630) (51,408) 0 51,408
(2) Replacement Cost Net Income net of tax effect exceeded Common Stock Dividends for Carpenter, Cleveland-Cliffs, 
Copperweld, Kaiser, and Lukens.
Appendix A has been prepared under the hypothetical assumption that all productive assets and inventories were replaced at their 
replacement cost. Under this assumption, additional Replacement Cost expense would be deductible for federal income tax purposes. 
Using the statutory tax rate of 48% for 1977, we have computed the Replacement Cost Net Income, net of taxes. As Appendix A 
illustrates, a comparison of common stock dividends with Replacement Cost Net Income net of tax effect shows eight of thirteen 
companies paying a common stock dividend in excess of Replacement Cost Net Income net of tax effect.
It should be further noted that because of Investment Tax credits, present and prior operating losses, losses due to discontinued 
operations, and other financial events, many of the steel companies did not pay taxes at the statutory federal income tax rate of 48% in 
1977.
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